I admit that we could use the Chinooks and Apaches out there, but I bet they’re the training aircraft needed to keep aircrew skills up. I doubt being parked up somewhere different for three nights will critically impact training.

I’m sure the Globemasters could be shipping stuff to and from theatre, but if they’re needed they won’t be there.

As for damn near all the rest- they either aren’t needed out there or aren’t capable of being used there.

I don’t object to people making a fuss about critical equipment shortages, but complaining about an airshow is petty. Many in the Forces get weekends off when they’re not deployed or on exercise, so aircraft would be sat idle… just on a different base.

Is the full gravity of the Resource Situation in Afganistan is really understood?

When the Soviets invaded Afganistan in 1979, the initial Soviet force was around 1,800 tanks, 80,000 soldiers and 2,000 AFVs. In the second week alone, Soviet aircraft had made a total of 4,000 flights into Kabul.

Between December 25, 1979 and February 15, 1989, a total of 620,000 soldiers served with the forces in Afghanistan (though there were only 80,000-104,000 serving at one time): 525,000 in the Army, 90,000 with border troops and other KGB sub-units, 5,000 in independent formations of MVD Internal Troops, and police forces. A further 21,000 personnel were with the Soviet troop contingent over the same period doing various white collar and blue collar jobs.

The total irrecoverable personnel losses of the Soviet Armed Forces, frontier, and internal security troops came to 14,453. Soviet Army formations, units, and HQ elements lost 13,833, KGB sub-units lost 572, MVD formations lost 28, and other ministries and departments lost 20 men. During this period 417 servicemen were missing in action or taken prisoner; 119 of these were later freed, of whom 97 returned to the USSR and 22 went to other countries.

There were 469,685 sick and wounded, of whom 53,753 or 11.44 percent, were wounded, injured, or sustained concussion and 415,932 (88.56 percent) fell sick. A high proportion of casualties were those who fell ill. This was because of local climatic and sanitary conditions, which were such that acute infections spread rapidly among the troops. There were 115,308 cases of infectious hepatitis, 31,080 oftyphoid fever, and 140,665 of other diseases. Of the 11,654 who were discharged from the army after being wounded, maimed, or contracting serious diseases, 92 percent, or 10,751 men, were left disabled.

After the war ended, the Soviet Union published figures of dead Soviet soldiers: the total was 13,836 men, on average, and 1,537 men a year. According to updated figures, the Soviet army lost 14,427, the KGB lost 576, with 28 people dead and missing.

Material losses were as follows:
118 aircraft
333 helicopters
147 tanks
1,314 IFV/APCs
433 artillery guns and mortars
1,138 radio sets and command vehicles
510 engineering vehicles
11,369 trucks and petrol tankers
The collateral damage in Afghanistan was worse.
Over 1 million Afghans were killed. 5 million Afghans fled to Pakistan and Iran, 1/3 of the prewar population of the country. Another 2 million Afghans were displaced within the country. In the 1980s, one out of two refugees in the world was an Afghan.
Along with fatalities were 1.2 million Afghans disabled (mujahideen, government soldiers and noncombatants) and 3 million maimed or wounded (primarily noncombatants).

So lets see if I have this right…We are providing security across the same region with a small mobile force that will win hearts and minds. Yet we seem to be skimping on mobility equipment?

I am positive that we are doing a fantastic job on the ground!

But do we have enough of the right resources deployed?

Being very serious, the debate needs to be widened. It is not just about helicopters, it is about resources and state commitment. When the Queen can deploy her Grandson, we know it is not about resolve!

As a country we should have a War Effort by now, underpinned by a War Act (More Legislation, even Labour MPs should like that!). We are after all “at war with terror”!

Here is an example of what could be done immediately:

In Birmingham 800 LDV workers are directly out of work. In turn about 3000 workers face uncertainty within the LDV supply chain. The state could take compulsory ownership of the LDV assets under a War Act. In turn, the workers could be re-employed and placed under the management of the Army. They could take on urgent refitting and repair work on Army Transport vehicles.

I understand that a rescue package was tabled at £5 million? (Peanuts compared with the cost of Trident).

LDV could make under license parts for 4 x 4 Ridgebacks and up armor Snatch Landrovers. All the while LDV could continue to develop its Maxus Electric Van, creating jobs for the future.

The debate on resourcing the War in Afghanistan is about Resources not Strategy. Our commanding officers can only utilise the resources we provide them. Which brings me back to the IAT…The IAT demonstrates we have equipment in a ready state that can be deployed. AND as the LDV example above shows, we have plenty of redundant resources that could also be utilised by the state to make new equipment or refit stuff that is unserviceable for Afganistan.

So the big questions are:
Where is the leadership from our Government to put all this right?
What price have we had placed on the lives of our troops? i.e. What spending restrictions are in place for Afghanistan and divide these by the number of troops deployed.

In closing, everyone should try and visit IAT to show support for our service personnel. They embody courage, sacrifice and valor and it is a good way for individuals to show they care.

If visitors get the chance they should also try and join the ordinary people of Wiltshire and Gloucestershire in Wootten Basset to understand the real cost of getting our resourcing policy wrong.

But please take the bus, as car parking in Basset is rubbish ;0)

Who will raise this issue?

It must get air time